Related Projects

This project aims at understanding the tragedy of the commons and identifying mechanisms that generate virtuous self-governance by the users of a local resource in communities of the Italian Alps between the years 1200 and 1800. A successful management of the commons involves solving  social dilemma-situations through mechanisms that promote co-operation. This research is problem-driven and interdisciplinary: it involves fieldwork, experiments, and simulations.

Studies of this project

The study by Casari (2007) is a field law-and-economics study on material collected in archives of Northern Italy and using game theory, in particular the Folk Theorems, to interpret the empirical evidence and the role of the legal institutions in overcoming the 'tragedy of the commons'.

The study by Casari and Plott (2003), an experimental study on peer punishment, was motivated by the apparent success of the field institutions in promoting co-operation. When the experiments were run in 1999, this topic was at the forefront of economic research. It showed the behavioral tendency of people to punish free-riders even if it is personally costly to do so, and how it improves the level of co-operation and pay-offs by the group.

The study of Casari from 2004 is a simulation study through genetic algorithms to measure the performance of the field institutions under the condition that the users are boundedly rational.