Small is beautiful: the efficiency of credit markets in the late medieval Holland

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In this paper, we analyse the functioning of private capital markets in Holland in the late medieval period. We argue that in the absence of banks and state agencies involved in the supply of credit, entrepreneurs’ access to credit was determined by two interrelated factors. The first was the quality of property rights protection and the extent to which properties could be used as collateral. The second was the level of interest in borrowing money at the time as well as such borrowing compared with the interest rates on risk-free investments. For our case study, the small town of Edam and its hinterland, De Zeevang, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we demonstrate that properties were used as collateral on a large scale and that interest rates on both small and large loans were relatively low (about 6 percent). As a result, many households (whether headed by men or women) owned financial assets and/or debts, and the degree of financial sophistication was relatively high.

1. Introduction

How important are capital markets, especially markets for small loans or “microcredits”, for economic development? The microcredit or microfinance movement has recently received a great deal of attention as a fundamental contribution to economic development, relying on the capacities of relatively poor men and women to develop entrepreneurial activities (Yunus 2008). It has also led to a new questioning of the sources of economic growth in Western Europe: what role did capital markets play in the process and when did “modern” capital market institutions originate? There is much literature on the financial revolution in different parts of Western Europe that partially addresses this question.¹ The authors concerned with this question have identified “financial revolutions” in the fifteenth-century Northern Italy (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006), sixteenth-century Holland (Tracy 1985), and late seventeenth-century England (Dickson 1967), but all these revolutions centred on the (increased) capacities of states to borrow money. It is not always clear how the private sector was affected by these developments. In fact, Clark (2005) and Epstein (2000) have argued that in England the most important changes in the private capital market preceded this financial revolution by as much as three centuries. For obvious reasons such as that the state left many detailed accounts of its activities, but the private sector often did not, it is much more difficult to reconstruct how private capital functioned: who had access to credit, who invested savings

¹ This literature on ‘financial revolutions’ is discussed in Sylla (2002).
in which type of securities, how flexible or inflexible were these markets, and how high were interest rates on small and large loans?

New institutional economics (NIE) is a major source for understanding the problems and possibilities of microcredit. The typical problem addressed by the microfinance movement is that in many situations in the current “developing” world transaction costs of small loans for female and male entrepreneurs are very high, resulting in extremely high interest rates. This severely limits the number of projects that can be funded and carried out or may result in the fact that men and women do not have access to credit at all. High transaction costs will mean that, although many potential projects are known to entrepreneurs and can be financed at an interest rate suppliers of capital are willing to loan their funds at, they will not find the necessary funding because the capital market does not function well. The result will be economic stagnation or at least less growth than in a situation of well-developed capital markets.

This market failure may be the result of a number of institutional weaknesses. The first and perhaps the most fundamental problem, the “de Soto problem”, is that potential entrepreneurs own certain assets that they might use as collateral but cannot, because of imperfect property rights (de Soto 2001). This may be caused by the absence of clear titles to land and real estate, the insecurity of property rights in general due to corruption and bad governance, the absence of rules about bankruptcy, and/or the liquidation of collateral or similar institutional problems. These problems make it difficult or impossible to use such assets as collateral for loans, or they can only be used at very high interest rates, because it is unclear whether and how the asset can be liquidated if the debtor defaults on his/her loan. The underlying problem is that when capital markets are embedded in very unequal socio-political structures, it is difficult to develop the kind of transparent property rights necessary for efficient functioning of capital markets.

The second institutional weakness concerns information asymmetries in the capital market. When no collateral is available—or even if it is available—substantial cost is involved in the liquidation of such collateral and information asymmetries will increase transaction costs. There is an *ex ante* information problem: the bank/lending agency has to assess the viability of the project for which the loan is supplied as well as the payback capacity of the potential debtor. Moreover, how can the lending agency select the most promising projects (Hoffman et al. 2000, 62–8)? There is an *ex post* information problem also: the lending agency will need to monitor the debtor’s payments and know his/her capacity to pay. If and when he/she does not pay, is that because of force majeure or is the debtor simply being opportunistic?

The third factor influencing transaction costs is related to the “thickness” of the market. The lending agency will also have other costs, such as overhead, which is part of transaction costs (the costs that must be covered by the interest on the loan). It can be argued that the thinner the markets are, the more such overhead will contribute to total transaction costs. Smaller loans, moreover, will have a larger fixed per loan overhead cost than larger loans, further punishing the small entrepreneur. Once a thick market develops, the cost for small loans can probably be reduced more than those for big loans.

We argue that the interest rate that households pay on their loans consists first of the “pure” reward for time preference, second of a risk premium that reflects the quality of the institutional framework (to what extent is it possible to enforce contracts and, for example, liquidate the collateral), and third of “pure” transaction costs, which are linked to the thickness of the market and the quality of information available.²

² See also Clark (2005, 5).
In a recent paper, Jaime Reis (2007) has suggested a way to assess the efficiency of the local capital market, which he applied to the Portuguese rural capital market in the second half of the nineteenth century. This method measures the interest rate margin between low-risk credits, such as government loans, and the rates usual for mortgages in the countryside. The difference is a measure of the risk premium of lending to farmers and other rural inhabitants and the extent to which rural capital markets worked well to successfully protect the property rights of creditors. The difference Reis found for Portugal was very significant; there was a gap of 3–4 percent between risk-free loans of 4–6 percent and the 7–10 percent that farmers paid (Reis also found evidence that this was fairly usual for the region: in Spain, this “risk premium” was at a similar level).

We also apply this idea to the Dutch capital market in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to measure two of the factors: the risk premium and the pure transaction costs that determined the interest rate and reflected the efficiency of the capital market. Following North (1990), the efficiency of the capital market is reflected in low transaction costs and a low risk premium, both resulting in relatively low interest rates for debtor and easy access to the capital market. To explain the patterns found, we also look at the extent to which households could use their assets as collateral (and the extent to which property rights were protected): did this society have a good solution to the “de Soto-problem”? In our case study, we focus on the capital market of a small town, Edam, and its hinterland, De Zeevang, in the northern part of Holland in the late medieval period (1460–1560). In other papers, we have shown that this was a region that in as early as the fourteenth century experienced a process of economic growth and structural transformation, resulting in the famous Golden Age of the seventeenth century (De Moor et al. 2009). This is part of the core area of the “first modern economy” that has been analysed in detail by de Vries and van der Woude (1997) in their seminal study of the Dutch economy from 1500 to 1800. They maintain that in the early modern period, the Netherlands already had a relatively modern set of institutions, which explains the strong performance of the Dutch economy in this period. By focusing on the capital market, this paper can be seen as a way to test this idea, much as Douglass North argued that interest rates are the best proxy for the efficiency of the institutional framework of an economy (North, 1990, 69).

We would like to understand why this process of growth began so early in the region of our study and, in particular, what role the capital market did play in the process. If NIE is correct, then this precocious process of growth must have had its foundation in efficient institutions related to the capital market, which would allow interest rates paid by (potential) investors to fall to a relatively low level. This implies that large groups of households—not only the rich, but also the middle class, and perhaps even the lower middle classes—participated in capital markets both as lenders and as borrowers and that this applied not only to households headed by men, but also to those headed by women. In some of the literature on microcredit, the strategic position of women in capital markets is stressed: in many societies, there are formal and informal barriers against women participating in (formal) capital markets. Yet, women are often much more entrepreneurial and, because of their regular, daily contacts with markets, have better information about potential projects that could be funded. The

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3 We assume that the real interest rate consists of a rate of pure time preference, a premium that reflects the expected increase of overall income, and a default risk premium (Clark 2005, 5).

4 We even go one step further than de Vries and van der Woude (1997) by arguing that as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the ‘modern’ institutions emerged that made possible the highly developed capital market and the strong performance of the Dutch economy; see van Zanden (2002b) and van Bavel and van Zanden (2004).
gains in including women in the (formal) capital markets are, therefore, very significant. For this reason, in this historical case study, we pay special attention to the role of women in capital markets.

We proceed as follows. After a brief introduction to the region and the main institutions governing capital markets in the area, we provide a (necessarily) brief answer to the first “de Soto” question: how well were property rights developed and did this allow households (headed by men or women) to use their assets as collateral. Next, we turn to the second question and, thanks to a very rich source covering the capital market of Edam and Zeevang in the period 1462–1563, we analyse the participation of men and women in capital markets there. We also try to establish the link between the size of loans and the interest rate—or perhaps the absence of such a link, which would also be significant.

2. How well were property rights protected?

There is a great deal of evidence that property rights in Holland were clear enough to allow for the emergence of capital markets, at least since the fourteenth century (Zuijderduijn 2009). The origins of this situation are to be found earlier, during the large-scale reclaims of peat lands in the high Middle Ages. To attract colonists willing to reclaim the area, territorial lords had to offer them freedom and near-absolute property rights, and as a result, even centuries later, peasants still held about two-thirds to three-quarters of the land.\(^5\)

Titles to land were protected by a property rights system based on ratification by local authorities in towns and villages. So, transfers of land within Edam were only valid when contracted in their presence: transferring land in any other way did not invest buyers with property rights. Since conveyance was also required to validate mortgages, there was only one place where property rights on land in Edam could be obtained, checked, and disputed: the Court of Edam (Zuijderduijn 2009, 184–90).

Local conveyance was practised as early as the thirteenth century. Initially, judges or aldermen merely witnessed transactions and had to rely on their memory if consulted about property rights. Over time, they began to issue contracts in writing, presumably because the growing number of transfers required it and because the increase in literacy allowed it. This is apparent from the existence of several contracts issued by the Court of Edam at that time. But this practice probably started at least a century earlier.\(^6\) The next step in the evolution of conveyance was recording of minutes of ratified contracts in registers. In Edam, the oldest register available dates back to 1564,\(^7\) but there is ample evidence that this practice may have started much earlier (Zuijderduijn 2009, 202–3).

This property rights system, in which there was only one institution capable of investing property rights, resolved much of the “de Soto problem”. The situation in 1564 (and we are sure that Edam kept a register of property rights then) is similar to that observed for modern land registries.\(^8\) To be sure, elsewhere in the Low Countries, property rights were

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5 The property rights colonists received are discussed in van Bavel 2010, 83–6.

6 Waterlands Archief (WA), Stad Edam (SE), inv. no. 448 (1451), 452 (1490). Contracts in writing in the North of Holland in the fourteenth century have been edited by Vangassen (1964).

7 WA, SE, inv. no. 3813. See also table 5.

8 de Soto (2001, 52) acknowledges the early emergence of formal property registries in the Middle Ages, but also stresses the importance of national registries. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that local registries could also contribute to efficient capital markets.
often less clear, for instance, in regions where property rights were invested by the courts in capital cities, as well as in small towns and villages.9

Of course, this property rights system also had to function in practice. To what extent did creditors risk facing bad governance? Medieval government often involved nepotism and corruption: many officials leased offices and had to look for ways to make good on their investments (Blockmans 1985). Others, such as aldermen, were volunteers recruited from local elites. They were expected to make up for the time they spent in public service in more informal ways.

There were a few checks on corruption, however. From early on, territorial lords took great care to prevent excessive abuse of power. They installed regional, high, and supreme courts, which plaintiffs could appeal to, although this was often a costly and time-consuming procedure.10 The officials in charge of regional courts also had the task of monitoring the functioning of local authorities. They particularly kept an eye on sheriffs, government agents who presided in local courts, and fined or removed them from office if they engaged in corruption and abuse of power (Zuijderduijn 2009, 46–52).

Checks on corruption were also present at the local level: abuse of power could cause conflicts and even social unrest. Equally importantly, the conveyance system allowed local courts to monitor transactions, which was useful for assessing taxes among the population. This system also allowed local courts to monitor whether contracting parties observed customary law with respect to prohibitions on minors selling or mortgaging real estate. Abuse of power was likely to reduce the number of people making use of the conveyance system, and hence, local courts would lose control over local trade.

What happened when mortgagors reneged? Creditors in possession of a ratified contract could immediately ask the sheriff of Edam to seize the mortgage, without having to go to court first. Debtors could appeal to seizure, but risked a fine of 6 s if their appeal was not upheld, which reduced the possibilities of stalling legal procedures (Bezemer 1894, 152). The debtor was allowed some time to offer a solution, for instance, a down payment, but if he/she failed to do so, the sheriff would invest the creditor with property rights. If there was more than one plaintiff, those with the oldest titles were given preference.

How would this affect some of the other problems we identified, such as information asymmetries? Investors looking for ways to assess the payback capacity of the potential debtor only had one place they could go to: the Court of Edam, where they could obtain a credit-rating for the mortgage they were about to accept. We also know that elsewhere in Holland local courts actively tried to prevent fraud and that aldermen took great care to investigate whether or not collaterals were already mortgaged (Zuijderduijn 2009, 193–7).

The best evidence we have linking this institutional framework to the capital market is the register of 1564. This source indicates that the people of Edam had 450–500 transactions in land, houses, ships, and capital registered by the local court every year.11 They did this in spite of having to pay a fee to the scribent and, perhaps more importantly, revealing their dealings to the local government, which exposed them to taxation. Moreover, very few people decided to go to nobles or clerics to have their contracts ratified.12 The people of Edam

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9 For instance, in the area around Bois-le-Duc, property rights could be invested by this town and village authorities. This unclear situation caused many disputes (van der Ree-Scholtens 1993, 90–8).
10 The Supreme Court was functioning since 1446, and after some changes in the first few decades of its existence, it was permanently established in Malines in 1503.
11 See table 5.
12 Nobles and clerics had lost their position in the ratification of contracts long before 1542, when ratification by local courts became mandatory (Zuijderduijn 2009, 207).
clearly preferred the public court because it linked them to the best institutional framework available. This does not mean that there were no other means to secure transactions: the first thing creditors would have done if they did not receive payments was to rely on social mechanisms such as peer pressure and group solidarity, and they may also have taken recourse to slander and physical violence (Zuijderduijn 2009, 214–7). But it is difficult to see how these means alone could have convinced creditors to invest considerable sums in the capital market. This is why they also demanded collaterals that were embedded in formal institutional structures: creditors would not have parted with their life savings without such assurance.

The evidence strongly suggests that property rights were well protected. This was in part due to the fact that the society was fairly egalitarian, having only a small feudal elite, the nobles. The nobles dominated high politics in Brussels, but were counterbalanced by the growing power of urban merchants who controlled politics in the cities, and via this channel, they became increasingly important in the political process. Many farmers owned their land, although land ownership by urban citizens and institutions was also increasing rapidly in these years. People had substantial trust in markets: a large share of the population (30–50 percent, according to different estimates) was (partly) dependent on wage labour (van Bavel 2006) and thus relied for a very large part of their livelihood on the market, not only for income, but also for expenditures. The staple foods, rye and wheat, were imported from the Baltic and, therefore, also bought on the market; most farmers specialized in livestock products such as butter, cheese, and meat. de Vries and van der Woude (1997) described this economy as the first modern market economy—they clearly have a point.

3. Test case: Edam and De Zeevang

The small town of Edam lies about 20 km to the northeast of Amsterdam, at the borders of what was then still known as the Zuiderzee. Recent calculations of population figures are 2,398 inhabitants in 1462, 2,337 in 1514, and 3,752 in 1563. Together with the surrounding countryside (called “De Zeevang”), it was a region very typical for Holland. De Zeevang was inhabited by 3,363 people in 1462, 3,655 in 1514, and 5,765 in 1563 (Boschma-Aarnoudse 2003, 421–6). The entire region was very urban (in 1462, more than 40 percent of its population lived in Edam), and it depended on a mix of activities: agriculture was still important, but a rapidly growing part of the work force was active in fisheries, industries, and trade (Boschma-Aarnoudse 2003, 367–75ff). Agriculture was characterized by small holdings, another typical feature of the Dutch economy: most (rural) households owned small plots of land they often used to herd a few cattle. They sold cattle and dairy products on the market.13

How does Edam compare to other towns in Holland? To answer this question, we used a government questionnaire from 1514, aimed at reviewing tax assessments of towns and villages in Holland (table 1). Since our sources recorded only those who received Holy Communion, we corrected our figures for the absence of people aged less than 13–14 years who were not yet Communicants. We assumed, as did Van der Woude, that 33 percent of the population fell in this category (van der Woude 1972, 77–85). The difference

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between our estimate of a population of 3,259 for Edam and De Zeevang in 1514 and the estimate of Boschma-Aarnoudse based on the verpachtingskohieren (3,655) seems to be reasonable. Since Edam and De Zeevang formed one taxation unit, we estimated the tax assessment for the individual town and villages. We also estimated the number of inhabitants for Edam (indicated in the source as from 1400 to 1500), as well as for Middelie and Haekswijk (villages combined in our source).

The source tells us about the population and, as a result of the assessments, the wealth of settlements. Holland had 6 “large towns” and 22 “small towns”, and clearly, when we look at the inhabitants and taxation, Edam was a typical small town, although it may have been relatively wealthy. The villages of De Zeevang compare quite nicely to other rural settlements in this part of Holland as well, with respect to both population and wealth.

The sources we used to analyse the Edam and De Zeevang capital markets, the schotkohieren and verpachtingskohieren, were registers used by the Edam and De Zeevang governments to levy taxes. The verpachtingskohieren are estimates of household wealth used to assess a distribution key for taxation that was drawn up in the schotkohieren. We know little about the incentives the government of Edam had to create the verpachtingskohieren. It is likely that the incentives were much like those of the Florentine government, which drew up a similar register in 1427, the famous Catasto. According to Anthony Molho, the Florentines did this because they wanted “a more scientific and rational system of taxation” (Molho 1995, 97).

| Table 1. Relative position of Edam according to the tax assessment of 1514 |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------------|
| Holland                         | 288,760  | 60,000         | 0.21    |
| Edam and De Zeevang             | 3,259    | 770            | 0.24    |
| Edam                            | (1,929)  | (454)          | (0.24)  |
| Six large towns (average)       | 11,550   | 4,248          | 0.38    |
| Twenty-two small towns (average)| 2,128    | 486            | 0.23    |
| De Zeevang                      | (1,330)  | (315)          | (0.24)  |
| Warder                          |          |                |         |
| Middelie                        |          |                |         |
| Kwadijk                         |          |                |         |
| Haekswijk                       |          |                |         |
| Region (average)a               | 600      | 158            | 0.26    |

Estimates given within parentheses.
Sources: Fruin, 1866, 185–9; Fruin, 1876–77, 271; Naber (1970).
aRegion: Fourteen villages in the areas of Amstelland, Gooiland, De Zeevang, and Waterland for which we have data on population and taxation.

The table only provides a general impression of the position of Edam and De Zeevang: towns and villages could expect to receive lower tax assessments when they understated the number of inhabitants. This is why population figures in Holland must have been somewhat higher.
beds—registered when the *verpachtingskohieren* were drawn up every seven or eight years. An assessor walked through the city and villages and stopped by the houses to interrogate the inhabitants. Therefore, the source provides a very detailed report for every household in Edam and the surrounding De Zeevang.

There are a few problems with these sources, however: first, tax registers based on interviews are likely to yield a biased picture because the taxable community will have done everything possible to appear impoverished and escape high taxation. On the other hand, these were small communities in which everybody knew a great deal about everyone else, and citizenship was considered a virtue, which may have enhanced willingness to pay community taxes and services (*Prak and van Zanden 2006*).

The *verpachtingskohieren* provide detailed overviews of the assets and debts of the households in Edam and De Zeevang for several years, of which we have sampled three (1462, 1514, and 1563). The problem with this source is that the values of the properties, particularly of the real estate, are not given in a systematic way: they show how many pieces of land or how many beds and houses a household possessed, but not their value, at least not systematically. Only for different kinds of debts and securities (annuities, for example) and, of course, for cash can we establish the value, although for annuities we often only know the value of the annual sum paid to the household and the interest rate, and only in this way can we calculate the value of the underlying principal. The other sources that can be used are the *schotkohieren*, which give for the same households in the same years the amount of the capital tax (the *schot*), which is based on an assessment of the net value of the assets of the household, as registered in the *verpachtingskohieren*.16

### 4. Credit instruments

One striking aspect of the Dutch capital market was the high level of differentiation and specialization of assets. All kinds of properties were being traded and used as collateral: for example, households did not only simply own houses, but sometimes also owned shares in houses (for example, in 1514, one Baernt Jansz. owned the house in which he lived, as well as two rooms elsewhere in Edam, one of which was rented to Pieter Pelser).17 This led to a very mobile market in real estate in which some people owned shares in many houses. The division of property into shares was a general phenomenon, applying to land, wharves, mills, fishing nets, and ships. Most famous is perhaps the system of shares in ships (*scheepsparten*) that emerged in the fifteenth century to finance (and profit from) the rapidly growing shipping industry. People could easily buy such shares, which sometimes were as small as 1/256th part of a ship. According to *Boschma-Aarnoudse (2003, 156–7)*, about 15 percent of the households of Edam owned such a share in a ship.

The shares in real estate could be financed through various kinds of loans. Loans contracted for a few years (*kustinghen*) were widely used to finance the purchase of real estate, as well as other goods (*Zuijderduijn 2008, 7*). We frequently encounter *kustinghen* in Edam, where they were secured on real estate and ships and ran for periods ranging from 2 to 12 years.18

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16 A detailed analysis of this source is presented in *De Moor et al. (2009)* and *Boschma-Aarnoudse (2003)*.

17 WA, SE, inv. no. 237, f. 228v.

18 Especially for 1563. We will be considering these *kustinghen* (referred to in the source as *kustingbrieven*) as a particular type of debt. Some examples of *kustinghen* on real estate can be found in WA, SE, inv. no. 237, f. 16, 187, 221v.
In addition to these financial instruments, a system of losrenten and lijfrenten (annuities) had been developed, which added to the flexibility of the capital market. Since the second half of the fourteenth century, public bodies and individuals traded renten: these annual pensions were in fact long-term loans devised to comply with medieval usury legislation (Schnapper 1957, 66–7; Munro 2003; Zuijderduijn 2009, 20–1, 48–50). Lijfrenten were paid until the buyer (rentenier) (or the person on whose life the annuity was based) died, and losrenten were paid until the loan was redeemed. Both were long-term loans, often running for several decades. By selling a rente, the rente payer attracted funds, whereas the rentenier bought an annual pension. The capital market facilitated trade in renten and thus helped redistribution of savings. Losrenten and lijfrenten were used to finance the long-term debts of cities and other public institutions, including, increasingly, states such as the province of Holland. But the system also became popular with individuals: in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was also used for financing retirement and arranging income flow between generations. For example, when a son (or daughter) took over the family properties (the farm or workshop), a lijfrente could be based on the father and/or mother who retired, with the properties of the family used as collateral to ensure the parent a permanent income for the rest of his/her life. Similarly, if, for example, a daughter decided to remain single and join a begijnhof (beguinage), her share in the family property could be converted to a lijfrente for the same purpose.

It is important to point out that the sums involved were usually too large to be merely used for subsistence. For instance, debtors who attracted money by selling a losrente thus borrowed large sums: the median for principals was 58 guilders (in 1514), which corresponds to a year's income for an unskilled labourer. We know that losrenten and lijfrenten were instruments typically used to purchase capital assets such as land, houses, and ships and that kustingen were often used to finance trade (Zuijderduijn and De Moor 2010).

5. Access to capital markets: a comparison between men and women

The literature on microfinance stresses the vital role women can play in economic development if given the right opportunities, such as access to capital (Yunus 2008). We, therefore, analysed separately the extent to which households headed by men and those headed by women made use of the capital market in Edam and De Zeevang. A striking feature in the sources studied is the large number of households headed by women and their strong economic position. Table 2 shows that during the sixteenth century, nearly 30 percent of all households were headed by women. In about 20 percent of these cases, they could be

and those on ships in WA, SE, inv. no. 237, f. 202, 204, 274v and WA, SE, inv. no. 238, f. iv. An example of the time span can be found in WA, SE, inv. no. 238, f. 8, 34v, 35.

19 The religious authorities allowed losrenten because only the debtor could decide when to repay the principal—the creditor could not. The scholastic arguments with respect to annuities have been analysed by Noonan (1957, 157–9, 232–6) and Schnapper (1957, 65–79).

20 A beguinage was a collection of smaller and larger (convents) buildings inhabited by a lay sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church. Beguines often brought considerable amounts of capital with them. For a tentative analysis of the relationship between the European marriage pattern, the development of capital markets, and the emergence of beguinages, see De Moor and van Zanden 2006.

21 See the detailed discussion in De Moor et al. (2009) and De Moor and van Zanden (2010). The large number of female heads of households cannot be attributed to the season in which the tax registers were made, because, as far
Table 2. Distribution of households in Edam and De Zeevang by gender and year, including the number of widows in 1462, 1514, and 1563

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male-headed households (%)</th>
<th>Female-headed households (%)</th>
<th>Of which headed by widows (%)</th>
<th>All (%)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male-headed households</th>
<th>Female-headed households</th>
<th>Of which headed by widows</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1462</td>
<td>84.39</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1514</td>
<td>70.81</td>
<td>29.19</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563</td>
<td>72.37</td>
<td>27.63</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.16</td>
<td>24.84</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: WA SE inv. nos. 237–238; verpachtingskohieren 1462, 1514, and 1563.
identified as widows; in other cases, we do not know or we are sure that they were not widows (for example, independently living beguines).

That these women effectively headed a household consisting of more than just themselves can be shown from the number of beds recorded for each household. On average, women had nearly as many beds in their houses as men did, indicating that they must have been in charge of households of a similar size. On average, households headed by women had fewer assets than those headed by men, and they paid somewhat less taxes as well, but the differences were relatively small (De Moor et al. 2009). The fact that the sources provide this kind of information allows us to see the extent to which women and men had access to capital markets. But first it is important to explain how female households acquired significant capital assets. Dutch women were relatively independent in judicial and financial matters, thus allowing them to be active in the capital market. Most of them were under the custody of their fathers or husbands, but widows, wives of men who were abroad, and women having express or tacit power of attorney could engage in judicial actions aimed at the acquisition of property (Niessen 2005, 52–3; van der Heijden 2006, 161–2). We know from a number of studies that women in Holland and elsewhere in the Low Countries participated in the capital market and that they had ample opportunity to decide how to manage savings (Tracy 1985, 144–5; Hanus 2006, 19; van der Heijden 2006, 161–5).

It is not easy to analyse the degree to which households had access to capital markets on the basis of information on the assets and debts of these households. The problem is that we can see which households owned certain assets or debts, but we do not know who were excluded from the capital market because the source does not inform us about this. If certain households did not own securities, it can still mean two things: that they did not want to buy or sell such property titles (because they may have invested their savings in land, cattle, or other assets) or that the market did not “allow” them to do so (due to high transaction costs). The fact that we can discriminate between men and women is helpful in this respect, as usually women are the weaker party in (capital) markets. If there are large gender differences in observed behaviour, it is possible to suspect capital market failure, indicating that the capital market is only accessible to the happy few and not to all layers of society.

What can be learned from the results presented in tables 3 and 4 is that such differences were initially very small. In 1462, 28 percent of the households headed by women had some kind of monetary debt; for households headed by men, this percentage was 32. In the same year, the average size of women’s debts was higher than that of men’s. Again, this could mean two things: that women did have access to capital markets and could obtain large loans there or that their wealth was probably less, causing them to need larger loans. In the same year, 37 percent of the registered women owned some cash, compared with 40 percent of the registered men, but the average sums owned by men were larger than those owned by women. This situation changed in the next century: it appears that women’s access to capital declined—in 1514, only 14 percent of the registered women (who were heads of households) had some kind of debt; in 1563, this percentage increased

as we know, this was done in winter, when the fishing and shipping season was closed and the men would be expected to be at home.
Table 3. Cash, credits, and debts of households headed by women in Edam and De Zeevang (values in guilders) in 1462, 1514, and 1563

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female households</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Liijrente</th>
<th>Losrente</th>
<th>Debt</th>
<th>Kustingbrief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
<td>Debtor</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 160)</td>
<td>% a</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 324)</td>
<td>% a</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 460)</td>
<td>% a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 2.

%aPercentage of households headed by women.
Table 4. Cash, credits, and debts of households headed by men in Edam and De Zeevang (values in guilders) in 1462, 1514, and 1563

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male households</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Lijfrente</th>
<th>Losrente</th>
<th>Debt</th>
<th>Kustingbrief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creditor</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
<td>Debitor</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
<td>Creditor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1462</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 865)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1514</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 786)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average value</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 1,205)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 2.

aPercentage of households headed by men.
to 18. The percentage of male-headed households with a debt did not decline in a similar way: in 1514, it was still 32 percent; in 1563, it increased to 38 percent.

If we look at women as creditors, the picture is very different: in this respect, they seem to have strengthened their position from 1462 to 1514 (from 6 to 22 percent, respectively), whereas men moved from 5 to 15 percent in the same period; after 1514, no important changes occurred in this respect (women: 21 percent; men: 16 percent). Trends in cash holdings were very similar: the share of households headed by men as well as by women that invested in cash declined across the board. There was a broad tendency to change from cash to financial assets over time: the number of households that invested in losrenten or lijfrenten or in other forms of debts increased over time (from only a few percent in 1462 to about 20 percent in 1563), which is a sign of the growing efficiency of the capital market. The amounts invested also increased much more than the sums held as cash did, especially losrenten and other forms of debts (including kustenbrieven, which started to appear in 1563) became increasingly popular as a way to invest savings.

The picture that emerges is that women and men used the capital markets a great deal in this period, both for investing their savings (in the market, where women acquired a stronger position than men) and for obtaining credit (where men gradually used the capital market more than women). In 1462, we see hardly any gender differences in capital market participation, but from 1462 to 1563, they diverge somewhat. The explanation for these diverging trends is not straightforward. Were women becoming more cautious, was their access to credit restricted, or were they just doing better than men and, therefore, able to redeem their debts? The fact that, on average, in 1563, for the first time the cash holdings of women were larger than those of men means that a pessimistic scenario was unlikely.

Total financial securities (including cash) owned by men and women together amounted to 8–9 guilders per capita in 1462 and 1514 and 23 guilders in 1563; the ratio between financial assets and gross domestic product (GDP) can tentatively be estimated at about a third in 1462 and 1514 and 38 percent (of which 11 percent was cash) in 1563. These are all lower-boundary estimates because they exclude the securities for which there is no detailed information on their value. We do not know what the value of other assets was and cannot estimate the indices of financial sophistication (such as the share of financial assets in total assets) (see Goldsmidt 1969, 1987), but we think that the ratios between securities and GDP here are another proof of the relatively advanced nature of the financial system in this small town and its environment.22

Another way to look at the access to markets is to see how much selling and buying were going on. If markets are very active, it implies that the transaction costs are low, and “thick” markets also mean that the overhead costs can be spread over many transactions. For our research area, the first source that contains information for (almost) all transactions covers the year 1564, almost coinciding with the last verpachtingskohier of 1563. The Court of Edam was responsible for conveyance: transactions only had force of law when they were concluded in the presence of the town’s aldermen and the registers they kept have been preserved. We have studied all transactions of the first three months (March, April, and May) of 1564 that are covered by the register in detail. Comparison with the rest of the year shows that this was a busy period, with more transactions than those that had occurred, on average,

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22 In Western European countries, the ratio between financial assets and GDP fluctuated between 48 percent for Slovakia and 375 percent for Switzerland; the value for the Netherlands was 298 percent (in 2000); see European Commission/Eurostat (2008).
during the following nine months.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, we have to take into account that Edam was in the midst of an economic upswing in 1564 (Boschma-Aarnoudse 2003, 212).

The register confirms that this was a vibrant economy, with an estimated 450–500 transactions in markets for land, houses, ships, and capital every year (table 5), which is a great deal, taking into account the fact that there were only 1,665 households. The annual number of annuities contracted in Edam—and hence mortgaged on landed property in Edam and De Zeevang—was ca. 120. There was also a lively trade in houses, ships (Edam was a centre of shipbuilding in these years), and land. Most transactions were between inhabitants of Edam, although there were also quite a few villagers who created long-term debts. Women were prominent participants: they were parties to about a third of all transactions, both as creditor and as debtor. The register of 1564 clearly shows that women actively participated in capital markets and that, for example, the annuities they declared in the tax registers were not merely inherited.

6. Interest rates

We now turn to the interest rates found in our sources. As Douglass North has suggested, we expect interest rates to reflect the efficiency of the institutional framework of capital markets (North, 1990, p. 69; also Reis 2007). Applying this idea to Holland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is relatively straightforward. To begin with, we know that interest rates on public debt were already at a relatively low level. In Holland, interest rates on losrenten (redeemable annuities) declined from about 12 percent in the first half of the fourteenth century to about 6 percent after 1450 (Zuijderduijn 2009, 243–6). From a number of studies, it is also known that from 1450 to 1560, interest rates on government annuities (losrenten) were from 5 to 6.25 percent (Tracy 1985, 204–14; van der Heijden 2006, 121–3, 280–98; Hanus 2007, 38; Zuijderduijn 2009, 175–9); similarly, the town of Edam in 1550 paid 5 to 5.6 percent on a number of losrenten.

The interest rates paid in private capital markets in Holland compare favourably to those paid in public capital markets—even to those paid on the relatively reliable public debt of the

\textsuperscript{23} The three months that we have sampled contain 127 (35 percent) of the 358 transactions from March 1564 to February 1565.
province of Holland (Tracy 1985, 58, 109). The average interest paid on the annuities we encountered among the households in Edam was about 6.1 percent in 1462 and dropped to 5.6 percent in 1563 (table 6). The standard deviation was also relatively small, at “only” 0.7 percent (all interest rates taken together).

These findings suggest that private markets were considered equal to, or perhaps even more secure than, public markets: in both markets, the same interest rates of 5 to 6.25 percent were normal, with (again in both markets) a slight tendency to decline from 1460 to 1560. This implies that the risk premium and the transaction costs for both kinds of assets will not have differed significantly. The relatively low level of interest rates (5–6 percent is still usual in the twenty-first century) suggests that the De Vries and Van der Woude hypothesis about the modern features of institutions in this society is basically correct.

Another way to understand the default risk premium would be to compare interest rates to rental values of land. Data from 1514 show that the rental values in Holland were about 5 percent of the value of land, whereas the interest rates in Edam were about 5.7 percent. If we assume that leasing out land was relatively risk free, and involved more or less the same transaction costs as mortgaging did, it seems that a premium of 0.7 percent sufficed to convince savers to invest their money in private capital markets rather than in land. It again indicates that, in general, interest rates were very low and that the extra risk premium for credit based on collateral was very reasonable.

We tried to discover the factors that determined interest rates on the debts registered in our sources. The Edam and De Zeevang dataset allows us to observe the interest rate (on losrenten and other debts) as the dependent variable, and the following independent variables: size of the debt, available collateral (does the debtor own a house or land, and what is the total value of his/her assets?), and is the debtor male or female and in which year was it registered (1462, 1514, or 1563)? All regressions showed that only the year mattered, implying that the interest rates in 1514 were about 1 percent lower than those in 1462 and that they were slightly lower yet in 1563. But all other variables failed to link with interest rates: coefficients were close to

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**Table 6. Average interest rates (per cent) on private loans in Edam and De Zeevang (redeemable annuities)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1462</th>
<th>1514</th>
<th>1563</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edam</td>
<td>6.1 (9)</td>
<td>5.7 (103)</td>
<td>5.6 (109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeevang</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.3 (111)</td>
<td>5.8 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>6.1 (9)</td>
<td>5.7 (114)</td>
<td>5.6 (112)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N given within parentheses.

*Source:* See table 2.

Zuijderduijn (2009, 177) and a few additions based on a more detailed analysis of the sources.

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24 Zuijderduijn and De Moor (2010). The average rate of return to land was calculated using data from 24 villages in the North of Holland.

25 Compared with lending, where there was always a possibility that the debtor might disappear with the principal, leasing must have been more secure, simply because it was not possible to move the land. This is not to say that leasing did not involve any risks, but just that these risks would usually have been lower than those with lending.

26 Because almost all results are negative, we do not present the regressions here; the number of observations was 234; the (highly significant) constant term was 5.7%; regression results are available on request from the authors. However, independent variables may have been endogenous.
zero and always insignificant. This is an important finding: women did not pay higher rates than men, nor did people with many possessions have an advantage over those with few resources. Finally, the size of the debt did not matter either (only in 1514, we did find a very small negative link between size of debt and interest rate, but it was not significant in the regressions). We also tried to test whether loans from or credit to people from outside the region we studied (from Flanders in one instance) tended to have higher interest rates, but the limited number of examples did not make this feasible (our preliminary results, however, pointed in this direction).

These negative results are very significant. They point to similarities with the “priceless markets” that have been analysed by Hoffman et al. (2000, 3), who argued that prices also “did little to allocate capital or inform participants in the flourishing capital market of eighteenth-century Paris”. There, as in Holland in the late medieval period, it was probably the quality of collateral that determined who could borrow money and who could not:

To base debt transactions on prices, private credit markets would have had to require huge amounts of information. The alternative was for private debt markets to rely directly on information to discriminate among potential borrowers. Intermediaries focused their efforts on acquiring information about borrowers and made little effort to vary interest rates to reflect either a borrower’s specific risk or aggregate credit conditions. Potential borrowers competed on the basis of their collateral and reputation rather than on the expected value of their projects. (Hoffman et al. 2000, 300).

In summary, the absence of a price instrument for allocating capital demonstrates a limitation of this pre-industrial market, but the depth of the market and the low interest rates may have compensated for this deficiency.

7. Conclusions

We have demonstrated that capital market institutions in Holland were fairly efficient in the fifteenth century; there were very low interest rates (in fact, no higher than they are today) and offered access to credit at low cost to both men and women and to rich and poor households. Households headed by men and those headed by women participated actively in capital markets and, as the register of 1564 demonstrates, there was a lively trade in assets of all kinds, in which, again, women were also quite active (in about a third of all transactions).

The key to explaining the depth of this late medieval capital market and its low interest rates is that this society managed to solve the “de Soto problem” in a relatively efficient way, making it possible to use all kinds of assets as collateral. Property rights were well protected because all transactions had to be registered, and the legal and socio-political systems were transparent, which put severe constraints on the power of the mighty. Note that when the Spanish king Philip II tried to introduce an absolutistic style of government after 1555, it led to open revolt (beginning in 1566) and eventually to the establishment of the “free” Dutch Republic. Well-protected property rights were clearly an important part of the story, but markets generally functioned efficiently, and the actual costs of transacting an asset were also fairly low. Moreover, property was relatively widespread: almost all households owned a house (or part of it) and/or a plot of land that could be used as collateral.
Owning collateral was key to participating in the capital market. In this sense, this is not the same as modern microfinance, which is usually not based on such collateral. We also established that prices were not used to discriminate among borrowers, as almost all loans carried the same or very similar interest rates. From 1462 to 1563, interest rates tended to decline; in this respect, there is clear evidence that prices were determined by market forces. But the interest charged to individual borrowers did not discriminate between men and women, between households with ample properties and those with few properties, or among the properties owned by these households. Yet, the broad participation in this capital market suggests that the economy of Holland had “solved” the microfinance problem in the fifteenth century and was able to give its male and female entrepreneurs access to the capital required for developing their projects. Therefore, it should not be surprising that this economy was able to generate a process of economic growth resulting in an almost continuous growth of GDP per capita since the fifteenth century (van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2010). In the century after 1563 (when our sources end), this resulted in a “Golden Age”, when Dutch merchants dominated the international trade. We believe that this long period of prosperity was based on the solid foundation of a well-functioning microcredit system inherited from the late medieval period.

Acknowledgements

We thank Heleen Kole and René van Weeren for their important contribution to the dataset on the Verpachtingskohieren, the source that plays a central role in this paper. We also profited from comments on an earlier draft we presented at workshops in Utrecht and Leiden and from the comments given by the anonymous referees and the editors of the EREH.

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